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Antitrust and Competition Law Update: U.S.
v. Visa: Government Wins Major Rule of
Reason Case
William Kolasky, Robert Bell, Lee Greenfield, Veronica Kayne, Jim Lowe, Doug
Melamed, Thomas Mueller, and Ali Stoeppelwerth

Abstract

On September 17, 2003, the Second Circuit issued an important decision in U.S.
v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 2003 WL 22138519 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2003). The court
affirmed a district court ruling invalidating Visa and Mastercard rules that prohibit member banks from issuing American Express or Discover.1 The district
court had found that these ı̀exclusionary rulesı̂ substantially harmed competition
and failed scrutiny under a rule of reason analysis. Visa is noteworthy both because it is a (relatively rare) government win in a major rule of reason case ó with
the Second Circuit affirming the trial courtı́s rigorous inquiry into the rulesı́ anticompetitive effects and proffered procompetive justification ó and because it may
bring pressure for substantial structural changes in the card industry.
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U.S. v. Visa: Government Wins
Major Rule of Reason Case
On September 17, 2003, the Second Circuit issued an important decision in U.S. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 2003
WL 22138519 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2003). The court affirmed a district court ruling invalidating Visa and
Mastercard rules that prohibit member banks from issuing American Express or Discover.1 The district
court had found that these exclusionary rules substantially harmed competition and failed scrutiny
under a rule of reason analysis. Visa is noteworthy both because it is a (relatively rare) government win in
a major rule of reason case  with the Second Circuit affirming the trial courts rigorous inquiry into the
rules anticompetitive effects and proffered procompetive justification  and because it may bring pressure for substantial structural changes in the card industry.
Background

network services providers and issuers and
acquirers for their own cards.

Visa and Mastercard are network services providers that are owned and supported by
thousands of member banks, which act as both
issuers2 and acquirers3 of Visa and Mastercard
charge cards. (Network services are the infrastructure and mechanisms through which general purpose card transactions are conducted,
including the authorization, settlement, and
clearance of transactions.) By contrast, American Express (Amex) and Discover serve as both

Although Visa and Mastercard compete
against each other and Amex and Discover for
the loyalty of cardholders, in soliciting banks to
issue cards and providing network services to
issuing banks, Visa and Mastercard traditionally
have competed only against each other. This is
due mainly to provisions in the Visa and
Mastercard membership agreements providing
that each member bank may issue both Visa and
Mastercard, but not Amex or Discover. Any

1

U.S. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 183 F.Supp.2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

2

The issuing bank interfaces between the cardholder and the network by issuing cards to individual cardholders.

3

The acquiring bank interfaces between the merchant and the network by acquiring merchants charge card transactions.
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Market Power. The Second Circuit first
affirmed the district courts findings that Visa
and Mastercard (jointly and separately) have
power in the market for network services, which
the court assumed the government must prove to
win a rule of reason case.5 Although the district
court inferred market power from Visas (47
percent) and Mastercards (26 percent) shares of
card transactions in a highly concentrated
market, the circuit paid special attention to
evidence about specific conduct showing that
Visa and Mastercard have the power to affect
price or exclude competition. In particular, the
trial court relied on testimony from merchants
that (given customer preference) they could not
refuse to accept Visa or Mastercard even if faced
with significant increases in interchange fees
and evidence that, despite recent increases in
both networks interchange fees, no merchant
had stopped accepting their cards. Additionally,
the Second Circuit pointed to evidence that,
despite repeated efforts, Amex had been unable
to convince any bank in the continental United
States to issue its card because the exclusivity
rule would have required the bank to give up
membership in Visa and Mastercard. (The
courts reliance on evidence of specific conduct
is particularly important here, given that market
shares of 47-percent and 26-percent are well
below what is generally necessary to prove
market power based on inferences from market
share.)

member bank issuing Amex or Discover forfeits
the right to issue Visa or Mastercard.

The Department of Justice sued Visa and
Mastercard in 1998, alleging that the exclusivity
rules violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act and
stunted competition in two markets: (a) general purpose cards (charge and credit cards) for
cardholders and (b) network services for general
purpose cards. The district court held that,
given Visas and Mastercards popularity and
must carry status, the exclusivity rules made it
essentially impossible for banks to agree to issue
Amex or Discover. As a result, competition
suffered in two ways: (a) the rules reduced card
output, and cardholders were denied the benefits
of innovations and improved service resulting
from Amex and Discover partnering with
issuing banks (e.g., cards that are linked to
customers banking accounts) and (b) rivalry for
providing network services to issuing banks was
limited to Visa and Mastercard. The district
court invalidated the exclusionary rules, enjoined the defendants from restricting banks
from issuing other cards, and permitted Visa and
Mastercard issuers to terminate any contractual
obligations to abide by the exclusivity rules.4
The Second Circuit Decision

In affirming, the Second Circuit gave a
great deal of deference to the lower courts
factual findings. Indeed, Judge Levals opinion
(with Judges Cabranes and Oakes joining) is
notable for its intensive focus on the district
courts findings about facts specific to the
industry and practices at issue (rather than on a
more general application of economic theory)
and how those facts demonstrated that the
exclusivity rules harmed competition and
offered no substantial pro-competitive benefits.

Harm to Competition. The Second
Circuits affirmation of the district courts
holding that the exclusivity rules harmed competition was also closely tied to empirical
evidence. For the network services market, the
circuit relied on specific record evidence that
price and innovation competition to provide

4
DoJ had also challenged Visa and Mastercard dual-governance rules that permit a member-owner of one of the networks
to serve as a director of the other. The district court ruled for the defendants on that claim, and DoJ did not appeal that ruling.
5
The court observed in a footnote that some authorities, including FTC v. Indiana Fedn of Dentists, 476 U.S. 477, 460
(1990), suggest that that a plaintiff need not prove market power to win a rule of reason case if it can show actual anticompetitive
effects, but it specifically declined to rule on that issue given its affirmation of the district courts finding that Visa and Mastercard
had market power.
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way that is harmful to the Visa and Mastercard
consortiums collective interests. In the market
for network services, the exclusivity rules have
prevented Amex and Discover from selling their
products at all, thereby denying banks the
benefits of competition from Amex and Discover. In the general purpose card market, the
rules have kept cardholders from enjoying the
benefits of the increased quality and innovation
competition from Amex and Discover cooperating with banks to offer new products. (In effect,
Amex and Discover did not have means to
distribute products that required partnerships
with banks.)

network services to banks would be enhanced
with four competitors, rather than just two.


Both Visa and Mastercard executives
testified that greater network competition would force them to offer
issuing banks new and better products and services.



Outside the United States, where
Visas exclusivity rule did not apply,
Amex had convinced banks that
issue Visa cards also to issue Amex
cards, and competition from Amex
caused Visa to enhance its product
offerings to member banks abroad.



Pro-Competitive Justifications. Visa and
Mastercard argued that the rules were designed
to promote cohesion within their networks so
that those networks could compete effectively.
Therefore, they argued, the rules were ancillary
to a legitimate, procompetitive business strategy.

An internal Visa memorandum stated
that Visa would have to compete
more aggressively for market share if
Amex were permitted to partner with
member banks, [s]ince bank partners could significantly increase
[Amexs] acceptance and cards.

The Second Circuit affirmed the district
courts holding that the rules were not necessary
to achieve that goal, relying on record evidence
that Visa and Mastercard issuers have long
issued each others cards without damaging
network cohesion in a way harmful to the
competitive process. Further, the district court
found there was no evidence that defendants
network cohesion has been harmed overseas,
where the exclusivity rules do not apply, and
banks issuing Visa and Mastercard also issue
Amex cards.

Visa and Mastercard argued that, although the rules harmed their competitors, they
did not harm competition because Amex and
Discover were able to distribute their cards to
cardholders  as evidenced by their status as
the first and fifth leading U.S. card issuers
respectively. They analogized the rules to a
vertical exclusive dealing arrangement, which is
presumptively legal under Second Circuit
precedent.

Implications Of Visa

The Visa decision has important implications. A Second Circuit panel comprised of very
prominent judges handed the government a
victory in a major rule of reason case. That, in
itself, is important, particularly coming shortly
after the DoJs losses in Dentsply6 and American
Airlines.7 That a practice is subject to rule of

The Second Circuit, however, held that
the rules were, in fact, horizontal restraints that
are not presumptively legal. In effect, the court
held that the rules constitute agreements among
the 20,000 banks that compete with each other
to issue Visa and Mastercard, whereby each
bank agrees not to compete with the others in a
6

U.S. v. Dentsply Intl, Inc., 2003 WL 21946402 (D. Del. 2003).

7

U.S. v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).
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Finally, in light of recent developments,
the credit card industry may see continuing
pressure for structural changes and continued
antitrust controversies. In addition to the Visa
case, Visa and Mastercard recently settled a
challenge by WalMart and other retailers to
Visas and Mastercards honor all cards
policy;8 and a proposed merger between debit
card issuers First Data and Concord is currently
undergoing intense DoJ scrutiny.9

reason analysis does not, of course, mean that
the defendant always wins.

Visa also reinforces that facts matter.
Rule of reason analysis requires careful weighing of real world anticompetitive effects and
procompetitive justifications. Especially given
the growing acceptance of post-Chicago scholarship, we anticipate that courts (like in Visa) will
increasingly pay even closer attention to record
facts and economic testimony that is closely tied
to those facts, rather than rely on broad assumptions about likely competitive effects in the
abstract. They will not hesitate to declare illegal
practices that, in their view, do not withstand
close scrutiny. Accordingly, companies and
counsel must be prepared to defend controversial practices based on their actual competitive
effects, not just theory.

If you would like more information
about the Visa case or any other issue of U.S. or
foreign antitrust or competition law, please
contact us at: (202) 663-3600.
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The honor all cards policy required retailers accepting Visa and Mastercard charge cards to also accept the associations
offline debit cards (which are more costly to process than online debit cards) at a similar interchange fee. In April 2003, Visa and
Mastercard agreed to modify their rules, allowing retailers to accept either online or offline debit cards beginning in 2004, and to
lower interchange fees on debit cards beginning in August 2003. What Happened: $3 Billion Payout, Lower Fees, Honor All Cards
To Change, THE GREEN SHEET, Issue 03:05:01 (2003), available at http://www.greensheet.com/PriorIssues-/030501-/default.htm.
8

In April, 2003, debit card issuers First Data Corp. and Concord announced plans to merge, hoping to combine their Star and
NYCE debit networks to create a coast-to-coast online and offline debit network. DoJ has issued a Second Request; the parties have
announced that they intend to close the transaction in the fourth quarter of 2003, subject to regulatory approval. Steven Marlin, First
Data-Concord Merger Creates Payments Powerhouse, BANK SYSTEMS & TECHNOLOGY ONLINE (4/24/03), available at http://
www.banktech.com/story/fsconvergence/BNK20030424S0001.
9
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